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Abstract— As problems in machine learning, smartgrid dis-
patch, and IoT coordination problems have grown, distributed
and fully-decentralized optimization models have gained atten-
tion for providing computational scalability to optimization
tools. However, in applications where consumer devices are
trusted to serve as distributed computing nodes, compromised
devices can expose the optimization algorithm to cybersecurity
threats which have not been examined in previous literature.
This paper examines potential attack vectors for generalized
distributed optimization problems, with a focus on the Alter-
nating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM), a popular tool
for convex optimization. Methods for detecting and mitigating
attacks in ADMM problems are described, and simulations
demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed models. The weak-
nesses of fully-decentralized optimization schemes, in which
nodes communicate directly with neighbors, is demonstrated,
and a number of potential architectures for providing security
to these networks is discussed.
I. MOTIVATION
With increased computing power, convex optimization
tools have gathered attention as a fast method for solving
constrained optimization problems. However, some problems
are still too large to be solved centrally- e.g. scheduling the
energy consumption of millions of electric vehicles.
In these applications, decentralized optimization tech-
niques break the problem into a set of subproblems which
can be rapidly solved on distributed computing resources,
with an aggregator or fusion node bringing the distributed
problems into consensus on a global solution. This distri-
bution can yield significant computational benefits, greatly
speeding computation times.
A further development on this model, fully-decentralized
optimization techniques remove the aggregator, and instead
let nodes reach consensus with neighbors, in a process which
gradually brings the entire system into consensus (see Fig-
ure 1). This approach significantly reduces communication
requirements relative to aggregator-coordinated systems.
The potential for reducing computation time and com-
munication burden makes these distributed and fully-
decentralized models particularly compelling in smartgrid
applications, where systems may need to scale to millions
of devices. However, by moving the computation from enter-
prise servers to consumer devices, significant new security
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Fig. 1: Different structures for solving mathematical op-
timization problems, from left: Centralized optimization,
where all details of objective and constraints are held
by a central entity. Decentralized optimization (also called
aggregator-coordinated optimization) where local nodes hold
local objective and constraint information, and an aggregator
brings nodes into consensus on shared constraints. Fully-
decentralized optimization, where no centralized entity exists
but neighbors communicate directly with each other to
achieve consensus.
weaknesses are exposed. This article outlines architectures
and algorithms for addressing these weaknesses.
II. BACKGROUND LITERATURE
The vulnerability of physical infrastructure to cyberattacks
was dramatically highlighted in 2000 when the SCADA
system controlling the Maroochy Water Plant in Australia
was remotely hijacked, resulting in the release of over one
million gallons of untreated sewage [1]. A decade later,
the US government developed the Stuxnet worm to attack
programmable logic controllers which operated uranium en-
richment centrifuges managed by the Iranian government
[2]; the Iranian government recently launched similar attacsk
against targets in Saudi Arabia [3]. A descendant of the
Stuxnet worm was used more dramatically by the Russian
government to repeatedly cause widespread blackouts in
the Ukranian electricity during 2016 and 2017 [4], [5].
Recent incursions into the networks of American electricity
operators by Russian hackers may be laying the foundation
for future incursions against U.S. infrastructure [6], [7].
Against this backdrop of cyberattacks used as national
security threats, President Obama issued an Executive Order
[8] and Presidential Policy Directive [9], [10] directing the
executive branch to improve cybersecurity of critical infras-
tructure. In the face of proven vulnerabilities in consumer-
level smart grid devices [11] it seems critical that distributed
algorithms for smartgrid controls be designed to be able to
identify, localize, and mitigate the effects of these attacks.
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Fig. 2: Publication frequency for the topics of ‘Distributed
Optimization’, ‘Cybersecurity’, and the intersection of the
two fields, 2010-2017. Legend captions include the total
number of publications over this period; the number of
publications at the intersection is three orders of magnitude
less than each field.
Prompted by these concerns, cybersecurity research has
increased in recent years, as shown in Figure 2. However,
this research is far outpaced by the development of new
distributed optimization algorithms, and research on the
intersection of the two fields - the security of distributed
optimization algorithms- is still nascent. Instead, the most
cutting-edge research on distributed optimization techniques
under adversarial attacks is found not in power systems or
optimal control, but in the field of artificial intelligence.
The deployment of distributed machine learning algo-
rithms to very large computation networks or federated
machine learning platforms (in which consumer feedback
e.g. in smartphone apps directly trains an estimator) has led
researchers to work on algorithms which can be resilient to
software crashes, network dropouts, and adversarial attacks
on local nodes.
Most of these machine learning problems are solved with
consensus algorithms, in which local nodes solve private
problems and reach consensus on a global estimator through
iteration with a fusion node (aggregator-based model) or with
their neighbors (fully-decentralized model). Although widely
used, it has been shown that arbitrary attacks by a single
corrupted node can lead consensus algorithms to fail [12],
[13]- making it critical to understand potential attack vectors,
detection algorithms, and mitigation strategies.
As a result, research to combat these approaches has
considered a number of methods for developing techniques to
allow the consensus algorithm to converge to a best estimate
under attack [12]:
• Filtering techniques remove outliers from the set of
proposed updates [14], [12], [15], in extreme cases
using just the median estimator [16], [17] in order to
provide tolerance to an attack of half of the nodes.
These approaches can be computationally intensive, and
may require that the local update functions are all
drawn from the same distribution- feasible in statistical
estimation, but unlikely in device scheduling.
• Nonlinear weighting schemes take advantage of all
estimators, but dynamically scale down the impact of
suspicious updates. While these are guaranteed to move
towards optimum [13], [18], [19], they have a larger
optimality gap than other techniques [20].
• Round-robin techniques seek to detect and remove at-
tacked updates by iteratively computing the consensus
estimate with different combinations of dropped-out
nodes, and using the most stable estimate [21], [22],
[15]. This is algorithmically simple but computationally
intensive, and is most feasible when the number of
attackers is well-bounded.
Additionally, [20] demonstrates the improved conver-
gence of these algorithms when compromised nodes can be
switched off.
While many of these algorithms were developed for
aggregator-coordinated machine learning problems, many of
them can be adapted to fully-decentralized structures, as
in the estimation problems studied in [23], [19] and the
optimization problem studied in [21].
Some of these techniques are beginning to also be de-
ployed in smartgrid optimization problems: [24] demon-
strates the hurdle which compromised nodes create for
scheduling, much like [25] does for generalized consensus
problems.
However, most research on cybersecurity in power system
applications has not considered scheduling and optimization
problems, but rather state estimation in transmission net-
works. Liu et al demonstrate in [26] that a single compro-
mised node could introduce an arbitrarily large estimation
error, similar to the generalized results in [25]. Subsequent
research demonstrated the limitations of attack detection and
mitigation strategies under a number of centralized state
estimation models [27], [28], [29].
These approaches have also been extended to distributed
optimization techniques in [22], where a round-robin ADMM
method is used to identify compromised nodes; this approach
is demonstrated experimentally in [30]. Similar research has
also developed fully-decentralized algorithms for state esti-
mation, with [31] utilizing compressed sensing techniques
to recover an estimate of system state when noise injection
is bounded, though [32] demonstrates that these approaches
still fail when a node is able to inject arbitrary noise.
Novel Contributions
This work advances prior literature by providing an attack
detection algorithm for the alternating direction method
of multipliers, a popular optimization algorithm used for
convex optimization and consensus problems. Only requir-
ing that the private objective functions be convex, the at-
tack detection algorithm works for both constrained and
unconstrained problems, and both aggregator-coordinated
and fully-decentralized architectures. By directly identifying
compromised nodes, we bypass many of the objections to the
filtering, nonlinear averaging, and round-robin techniques de-
scribed above. Additionally, the proposed detection algorithm
can readily be integrated into computational techniques, such
as those described in [20].
In developing this, this paper provides the following novel
contributions to existing literature:
• Outline a taxonomy of attack vectors for decentralized
optimization algorithms
• Detail attack detection, localization, and mitigation
techinques for the alternating direction method of mul-
tipliers
• Demonstrate and verify an algorithm for detecting
noise-injection attacks in the alternating direction
method of multipliers
• Outline the unique security challenges of fully-
decentralized optimization
• Describe potential architectures for security in fully-
decentralized optimization
III. OUTLINE
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In
Section IV we establish some mathematical background and
notation. Section V outlines a taxonomy of methods by
which an attacker may seek to compromise a decentralized
optimization algorithm, and briefly discuss challenges to
detection, localization, and mitigation.
Section VI derives an algorithm for detecting noise-
injection attacks in convex optimization problems solved
with ADMM, and Section VII provides results for a set
of simulations with randomly-generated quadratic programs
(QPs). Sections VIII and IX describe limitations and exten-
sions, respectively.
Sections X and XI extend the cyberattack detection al-
gorithm by considering the unique security challenges pre-
sented by fully-decentralized optimization algorithms. Sec-
tion XII outlines architectures which can be used to over-
come the weaknesses inherent in fully-decentralized archi-
tectures. Finally, Section XIII summarizes the article’s main
results.
IV. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND AND NOTATION
A. Notation
Without loss of generality, we focus on an aggregator-
coordinated system with two nodes which compute the x-
update and z-update steps in a decentralized optimization
problem. Also without loss of generality, we will consider
an attack in which the x-update node has been compromised,
and use the following notation:
• A,B Constraint matrices in ADMM binding constraint
• c, d Linear cost vectors
• f(x), g(z) generalized objective functions
• H Hessian
• i, j iterates
• k iterate limit
• m,n Number of dimensions of z and x variables
respectively
• p Number of binding constraints
• P,Q quadratic cost functions in sample problems
• r, s dimensions in Hessian
• u Scaled dual variable
• w combined variable for centralized solution
• x, z Optimization variables
• y Unscaled dual variable
• X ,Z The private constraints, knowable only to the
compute nodes and not publicly shared
• x?k The unattacked update, solving xk :=
argminx∈X f(x) +
ρ
2‖Ax+Bzk−1 − c+ uk−1z ‖22
• x˜k The attacked signal provided by the z node
• x?k The variable update received by the z-update node,
of unknown validity
• xˆk A best response created by the z-update node which
has received a signal perceived as being an attack
B. Decentralized Optimization
In general, decentralized optimization problems can be
cast as:
x∗, y∗ = argminx,z W (x, z)
s. to: x, z ∈ W
where x and z further satisfy local problems:
x∗ = argminx f(x, z
∗)
x ∈ X
z∗ = argminx g(z, x
∗)
z ∈ Z
In this discussion we focus on iterative methods,
where updates xk = argminx∈X f(x, z
k−1), zk =
argminz∈Z g(z, x
k−1) solve local updates in an algorithm
which converges to a global solution, i.e. xk → x∗, zk → z∗
as k →∞.
In addition to computational benefits, this architecture
is also advantageous when the local objective functions
f(x), g(z) or local constraint sets x ∈ X , z ∈ Z contain
private information which can not be directly shared with
other participants or the aggregator. In this scenario, the
updates xk, zk do not directly reveal private information, yet
still allow the system to converge to the global optimum. This
is common in markets and scheduling problems, where par-
ticipants have private constraints or utility functions which
they do not wish to share for economic or security reasons.
Additionally, we assume that some information about
the private constraint set is publicly knowable, creating a
superset which contains the private constraint set: X ⊂
Xpub, Z ⊂ Zpub. Note that as all variable updates are in
the private constraint set, they must also be in the public set:
xk ∈ X ∈ Xpub.
C. The Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers
Although any distributed optimization algorithm may be
subject to cyberattack, we specifically consider the Alternat-
ing Direction Method of Multipliers (or ADMM) algorithm
reviewed in [33], which has gained popularity due to its
simple formulation and guarantees of convergence for convex
problems. The ADMM algorithm is used to decompose a
problem with separable objective and constraints:
min
x,z
f(x) + g(z) (1)
s.t. Ax+Bz = c (2)
x ∈ X (3)
z ∈ Z (4)
Note that only equation 2 links x and z.
Adding a penalty term for violations of the linking con-
straint, we can create an augmented Lagrangian defined in
the domain {x ∈ X , z ∈ Z}:
Lρ(x, z, y) = (5)
f(x) + g(z) + yT (Ax+Bz − c) + (ρ/2)||Ax+Bz − c||22
The standard ADMM algorithm can then be expressed with
respect to this augmented Lagrangean Lρ(·) as:
xk+1 := argminx∈X Lρ(x, z
k, yk)
zk+1 := argminz∈Z Lρ(x
k+1, z, yk)
yk+1 := yk + ρ(Axk+1 +Bzk+1 − c)
or in scaled form:
xk+1 := argminx∈X f(x) +
ρ
2
‖Ax+Bzk − c+ uk‖22
(6)
zk+1 := argminz∈Z g(z) +
ρ
2
‖Axk+1 +Bz − c+ uk‖22
(7)
uk+1 := uk +Axk+1 +Bzk+1 − c (8)
The iterations stop when:
• The primal residual rk = Axk + Bzk − c has a
magnitude below a threshold pri, i.e. ||rk||2 ≤ pri
• The dual residual sk = ρATB(zk − zk−1) has a
magnitude below a threshold dual, i.e. ||sk||2 ≤ dual
As described in [33] the ADMM iterations will converge
to the optimal value of the objective function, and the primal
and dual residuals will converge to zero.
In this ADMM formulation, we refer to the “aggregator”
(or “fusion node”) as the agent responsible for updating u.
The aggregator:
1) receives updates from the x-update and z-update steps,
2) computes the u-update
3) broadcasts the updated value of u to the nodes respon-
sible for computing the x- and z-updates.
1) Consensus problems: ADMM has become a popular
tool for solving consensus problems in both machine learning
and power systems engineering, as both fields deal with prob-
lems where computation may be spread across thousands (or
millions) of nodes. In a consensus problem, local variables
xi and objective functions fi(xi), i ∈ {1, . . . , N} are united
by the constraint that at optimality, the local variables mirror
the global variable z:
min
x,z
N∑
i=1
fi(xi)
s.t. xi = z, i = 1, . . . , N
Collected, the ADMM form of this is:
xk+1i := argminxi∈X〉 fi(xi) + y
kT
i (xi − zk) +
ρ
2
||xi − zk||22
zk+1 :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
xk+1i + (1/ρ)y
k
i
yk+1i := y
k
i + ρ(x
k+1
i − zk+1)
Note that this structure generalizes minibatch stochastic
gradient descent, in which the local objectives are the gradi-
ents of the local estimators.
As this consensus algorithm is a specific example of
ADMM, results for the general ADMM problem will also
apply to the ADMM consensus algorithm. For clarity, in this
paper we will continue to refer to x- and z-update nodes,
even though a consensus problem may have thousands or
millions of x-nodes and a single z-update (aggregator) node.
Despite this difference in scale, the results we derive for
the general 2-node system will still be applicable to the
consensus problem.
We will also note that consensus problems are of particular
interest in many power system and machine learning prob-
lems, as well as in fully-decentralized optimization problems,
which include consensus networks.
V. ATTACK VECTORS IN DECENTRALIZED
OPTIMIZATION
When local problems contain private information, the cen-
tral coordinator can only check x, z ∈ W and cannot directly
verify that the updates x?k, z?k in fact solve the private
optimization problems. In this scenario, a malicious node
may submit a distorted update x˜k in order to mislead the
central coordinator with the goal of creating a sub-optimal
solution, an infeasible solution, or prevent convergence of
the iterative algorithm.
In this section, we briefly outline potential attack vectors
and methods for addressing them. Of these attacks, the most
generalizable but difficult to identify is zero-mean noise
injection, which we consider in detail below. These attack
vectors can be combined, but detection and mitigation efforts
will usually address these separately.
Sub-optimal solution: The compromised node solves a
modified objective function f˜(x) resulting in f(xk) < f˜(xk)
and consequently W (x˜k, zk) > W (xk, zk) as k → ∞. As
this does not change the problem structure (e.g. convexity,
private constraints), it is difficult to discern from an equiva-
lent problem with slightly modified characteristics, e.g. dif-
ferent consumer preferences. This makes attack prevention a
matter of appropriately structuring game-theoretic incentives
to avoid malicious distortion. As such, we do not consider
this in greater detail here.
Infeasible Private Constraints: An attacked node may
replace the constraints x ∈ X with a modified constraint
set x ∈ X˜ in order to result in an update which is not
feasible x˜k 6∈ X , as shown in Figure 3. This leads the
system to converge to a point which does not reflect actual
conditions, e.g. a schedule which is not operationally feasible
or a machine learning estimator distorted by false data. Be-
cause these constraints may arise from stochastic processes
(user preferences, input data) the aggregator cannot directly
discern an attack from an unattacked update with different
underlying data. As a result, defenses from this attack are
limited to cases where the aggregator can bound the support
of the problem, i.e. a publicly knowable constraint set Xpub.
In this scenario, attacks can be detected when updates lie
out of the support region, and the effect of the attack can
be mitigated by projecting the update back onto the support
region.
Infeasible Linking Constraint: Knowing that a solution to
the master problem must satisfy Ax + Bz = c, an attacker
may present an update which it knows to be unreachable
with these constraints, i.e. @z ∈ {Z|Ax˜k + Bz = c}. In
this case, convergence stops as the primal residual rk =
||Axk + Bzk − c||22 remains nonzero. This attack relies on
th attacker knowing some bounds on the set reachable by its
neighbor Z ⊂ Zpub in order to shape this attack. Similar to
above, detection relies on the same knowledge of the public
constraint set, and mitigation relies on projecting the attacked
signal back onto the feasible space. If the aggregator has
knowledge of the public constraints Zpub, then detection and
mitigation can easily be implemented at the aggregator level
for each signal.
Non-Convergence: An attacker may add a noise term
which varies with each iteration, i.e. x˜i = x?i + δ(i). When
the noise term is larger than the rate of convergence of the
problem, this results in a persistent residual which remains
above the convergence tolerance, as shown in Figure 4.
We examine in detail the case where the noise is unbiased
(zero-mean). When the noise is biased, the problem can be
considered a combination of a zero-mean noise injection
attack and one of the attacks described above, and addressed
accordingly.
VI. DEVELOPING A DETECTION ALGORITHM FOR
NOISE-INJECTION ATTACKS
Because the ADMM algorithm relies on private actors
computing x− and z−updates, these actors can distort the
prolem by providing inaccurate updates, with the goal of
X˜
Xpub
Xx∗
x˜∗
xˆ∗
(a) Attacked system in which detection and (lim-
ited) mitigation is possible, as X ⊂ Xpub ⊂ X˜
.
Xpub
Xpub
X˜
Xx∗
x˜∗
(b) Attacked system in which detection and mit-
igation is not possible, as the distorted constraint
set is a subset of the publicly known bounds on
the constraints, X ⊂ X˜ ⊂ Xpub.
Fig. 3: Graphical example of how an attacker may distort the
constraint set from X to X˜ to create an optimum outside of
the truly feasible set, and the limited ability to mitigate these
impacts by projecting onto a publicly knowable constraint set
Xpub.
Fig. 4: Plot of local residuals in a 3-node system under
noise-injection attack. Injection of noise prevents problem
convergence at nodes across the network.
creating a suboptimal or infeasible solution or preventing
convergence. We study the case of distorting the x-update
through injection of zero-mean noise, which is intended
to prevent convergence of the algorithm. The new update
becomes:
xi+1 := argminx∈X f(x)+
ρ
2
‖Ax+Bzi−c+ui‖22+δ(i)
Where δ(i) is a noise term which changes on each iteration.
The z-actor or the system aggregator is challenged to identify
the attack and take preventative actions before convergence
is prevented.
A. Attack Detection Overview
We play the part of the aggregator or z-actor, and wish to
detect an attack of x, using the values of the xi, zi, ui, i =
1 . . . k iterates. We rely on a priori knowledge that f(x)
must be convex, we trust the computations of zi, and we
can verify the ui values directly by using the other iterates.
We will detect attacks by assessing the convexity of f(x)
implied by the xi iterates, without being able to directly
assess f(x).
To do this, we will use the z− and u-update values to eval-
uate the local gradient of f(x), then use these local gradients
to construct a finite-differences approximation of the Hessian
of f(x). Testing whether this Hessian is symmetric positive
semi-definite will then allow us to test the convexity of the
x-updates; this is visualized in Figure 5. Given our a priori
knowledge that f(x) must be convex, any updates which
result in a nonconvex Hessian must represent an attack.
The algorithm progresses in three steps:
• Assess gradient
• Construct Hessian
• Evaluate eigenvalues of Hessian
1) Assess Gradient: We rely on the proof of ADMM
convergence1 provided by [33], and while we focus on
the x-update the same approach can be used for security
checks conducted by the x-update node. The gradient of f(x)
evaluated at xi is found as:
0 ∈ ∂Lρ(xi, zi−1, ui−1)
0 ∈ ∂f(xi) +AT + ρAT (Axi +Bzi−1 − c)
0 ∈ ∂f(xi) +AT (yi − ρB(zi − zi−1))
∂f(xi) = −AT (yi − ρB(zi − zi−1))
∂f(xi) = −AT (ρui − ρB(zi − zi−1))
where the last equality simply uses the scaled dual variable.
We will interchangeably use the notation f(xi) and
f(x)|xi to both indicate the definite evaluation of f(x) at the
point xi. The iterates i = 1, . . . , k thus give us a sequence
of gradient evaluations at points xi, i = 1, . . . , k. From this
sequence of gradients, we wish to construct the Hessian.
1specifically building on the Proof of Inequality A2 on pg 108 of [33]
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Fig. 5: Conceptualization of the attack detection process for
a n = 2 toy problem. Although the validator cannot directly
assess the private objective function f(x1, x2) (shown in
red-blue gradient), they are provided with a sequence of
iterates xk, and can to use a subset of these for the detection
algorithm, shown here as (x1, x2) points with f(x) = 0 due
to the unknown objective value. Using information from the
sequence of iterates, the validator can then assess the implied
gradient of f(x) at each of these points. Finally, from these
gradients, the validator can estimate the Hessian, and use
this to evaluate the convexity of the (unknown) objective
function. This can be conceptualized as a local quadratic
approximation of the objective function at the reference
point, shown in blue-green.
2) Construct Hessian: We wish to construct the Hessian
matrix
H =

∂
∂2x1
f(x)
∂
∂x1∂x2
f(x) . . .
∂
∂x1∂xn
f(x)
∂
∂x2∂x1
f(x)
∂
∂2x2
f(x) . . .
∂
∂x2∂xn
f(x)
...
...
. . . . . .
∂
∂xn∂x1
f(x)
∂
∂xn∂x2
f(x) . . .
∂
∂2xn
f(x)

To construct the Hessian, we utilize information gained
from the gradient evaluations at each of the iterates to
compute a numeric approximation of the local Hessian, using
a Taylor series expansion of the Hessian around that point.
Example: 2-Dimension Case: For clarity, we begin with a
two-dimensional case, i.e. xi = [xi1, x
i
2]
T and visualized in
Figure 6. We will consider two points xi and xj , and will
note the dimensions of these points using the subscripts 1
and 2.
In this case, the change in gradient from point xi to xj can
be approximated using the following difference equations:
x1
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Fig. 6: Visualization of the relationship between the iterates
xi, xj , the function surface f(x), and the gradient evaluations
∂f(x)|i, ∂f(x)|j . While the function surface f(x) and its
Hessian cannot be directly evaluated, the change in gradient
evaluations between xi and xj can be used to derive an
approximation of the Hessian.
∂
∂x1
f(x)|xj = ∂
∂x1
f(x)|xi + ∂
∂2x1
f(x)|xi(xj1 − xi1) +
∂
∂x1∂x2
f(x)|xi(xj2 − xi2)
∂
∂x2
f(x)|xj = ∂
∂x2
f(x)|xi + ∂
∂2x2
f(x)|xi(xj2 − xi2) +
∂
∂x2∂x1
f(x)|xi(xj1 − xi1)
This is visualized in Figure 6, where ∆x1 = (x
j
1−xi1) and
∆x2 = (x
j
2 − xi2). From the previous step, we can directly
evaluate the gradient terms
∂
∂xr
f(x)|xk , r ∈ 1, 2, k ∈ i, j (9)
and wish to solve for the second-order terms, which will
become the entries in the Hessian matrix. However, we
have n2 unknown second-order terms but only n equations,
making this system underdefined. In order to have a fully-
defined system, we need another set of difference equa-
tions, found by considering the difference with respect to
another point k. Using the notation (x1)|kj = xk1 − xj1 and
∂
∂x1
f(x)|kj = ∂∂x1 f(x)|k − ∂∂x1 f(x)|j we can now rearrange
the problem into the matrix equation
−→
G = D
−→
H (10)
or for the 2-D case:
∂
∂x1
f(x)|kj
∂
∂x2
f(x)|kj
∂
∂x1
f(x)|ki
∂
∂x2
f(x)|ki

=

(x1)|kj (x2)|kj 0 0
0 0 (x1)|kj (x2)|kj
(x1)|ki (x2)|ki 0 0
0 0 (x1)|ki (x2)|ki


∂
∂2x1
f(x)
∂
∂x1∂x2
f(x)
∂
∂x2∂x1
f(x)
∂
∂2x2
f(x)

In this form,
−→
G collects the changes in gradient eval-
uations induced by each difference equation, the matrix
D arranges the difference in coordinates at the evaluated
iterates, and
−→
H unstacks the entries of the Hessian matrix
H .
The entries of the Hessian matrix can then be found as−→
H = D−1
−→
G , or for the 2-D case:
∂
∂2x1
f(x)
∂
∂x1∂x2
f(x)
∂
∂x2∂x1
f(x)
∂
∂2x2
f(x)

=

(x1)|kj (x2)|kj 0 0
0 0 (x1)|kj (x2)|kj
(x1)|ki (x2)|ki 0 0
0 0 (x1)|ki (x2)|ki

−1

∂
∂x1
f(x)|kj
∂
∂x2
f(x)|kj
∂
∂x1
f(x)|ki
∂
∂x2
f(x)|ki

Expanding to n dimensions: Generalized to r, s ∈ l
dimensions (where l ≤ n), this becomes:
∂
∂xr
f(x)|xj = ∂
∂xr
f(x)|xi +
l∑
s=1
∂
∂xr∂xs
f(x)|xi(xjs − xis)
As there are n dimensions in x, there are a total of n2
unknown terms in the Hessian 2. As each new point xj has
n dimensions, it adds a new set of n difference equations.
In order to fully define the set of equations for computing
the Hessian, we need to collect a total of n + 1 linearly
independent points (reference point plus differences with n
points) to solve for the n2 terms in H . Since computing the
gradient utilizes values from two iterates, this means that for
a problem with n dimensions, the detection algorithm can
be conducted on iterations n+ 2 and beyond.
In the following, we index dimensions by 1, 2, . . . , n and
points by a, b, . . . , k where k is used as the reference point.
The vector
−→
G is thus composed by stacking the gradient
evaluations:
−→
G =

∂
∂x1
f(x)|ka
∂
∂x2
f(x)|ka
...
∂
∂xn
f(x)|ka
...
∂
∂x1
f(x)|kk−1
∂
∂x2
f(x)|kk−1
...
∂
∂xn
f(x)|kk−1

2or n(n + 1)/2 if we utilize the fact that the Hessian is symmetric,
i.e. that ∂
∂x1∂x2
= ∂
∂x2∂x1
. For simplicity, we will not take advantage
of symmetry in this manuscript, though this symmetry can be utilized to
accelerate the solution time of the algorithm.
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Fig. 7: The introduction of noise shifts the gradients com-
puted using the above algorithm, shown here as shifting the
unattacked (gray) vector to a new (attacked, red) position. It
can be readily seen that a sufficient displacement will cause
the estimated curvature (Hessian) to become nonconvex, as
shown by the inferred surface represented in Subfigure (b).
To avoid detection, an attacker would thus need to use a very
small injected signal, but this would limit their ability to stop
convergence during the attack.
The matrix D is composed of a stack of n block-diagonal
matrices, each of which is the Kronecker product of the n-
dimensional identity matrix and a set of coordinate differ-
ences from x-iterates. Each block of this is n×n2, producing
D ∈ Rn2×n2 :
D =

In ⊗ (xk − xa)T
In ⊗ (xk − xb)T
...
In ⊗ (xk − xk−1)T

We solve for the Hessian elements by computing
−→
H =
D−1
−→
G as before.
3) Assess Convexity: For f(x) to be convex, the Hessian
must be positive semi-definite, i.e. λmin(H) ≥ 0 where
λmin(H) is the least eigenvalue of H .
After solving for a local approximation of the Hessian as
above, the eigenvalues of the Hessian are evaluated. If the
Hessian is not found to be positive semi-definite, then we
suspect the x-actor may be injecting noise into his updates,
as shown in Figure 7.
4) Misclassifications: As attack detection can be viewed
as a classification problem, it may be subject to two possible
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Fig. 8: Depiction of misclassification errors in the noise
detection algorithm. In weakly convex regions of a func-
tion, numeric conditioning errors can lead to false positives
(subfigure a), whereas problems which have a very strong
gradient may converge before the noise detection algorithm
is able to identify the injection of noise into the algorithm
(subfigure b). In both cases, the scheme for selecting points
used to assess the gradient can lead to more accurate assess-
ment of the Hessian, reducing misclassification errors.
errors, depicted in Figure 8.
• False Positives (Type 1 errors): These occur when an
attack is detected, even though no attack took place.
This can occur when numeric issues create a slight local
non-convexity during solution iterations, even though
the underlying objective function is, in fact, convex.
These numeric issues can result from the x-update,
y-update, gradient calculation, or Hessian calculation,
but are aggravated when the algorithm is close to the
objective function and the system of equations used to
generate the Hessian is poorly conditioned.
• False Negatives (Type 2 errors): In this type of error
the algorithm fails to detect an attack, because the
magnitude of the attack was not sufficient to create a
non-convexity at the tested points. A small number of
false positives are unavoidable: some attacks are not
able to prevent convergence within a small number of
iterations, and the attack detection algorithms may never
be able to collect enough points to detect an attack.
For problems that converge with a moderate number of
iterations under attack, there may not be a combination
of iterate points which result in a nonconvex Hessian.
For other cases, lowering the false negative rate requires
testing a variety of point combinations in order to
maximize the likelihood of finding a point where the
finite-difference Hessian estimate is nonconvex.
VII. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
To verify the effectiveness of this problem under a va-
riety of conditions, we simulate a large number of sample
problems (both attacked and unattacked) and evaluate the
effectiveness of the attack detection algorithm.
We have chosen to consider quadratic programs (QPs):
they are widely used in power systems research (e.g. optimal
power flow [31], optimal dispatch [34], [35]), subsume the
set of linear programming problems, and yet offer many
computational benefits (efficient off-the-shelf solvers, easy
analytic solutions, easily visualized). In the future, we would
like to extend this to other classes of convex problems (e.g.
SOCP, SDP), but simulating hundreds of those problems
would be computationally burdensome.
A. Problem: Random Quadratic Programs
We consider unconstrained quadratic programs of the form
min
x,z
xTPx+ cTx+ zTQz + dT z
s.t. Ax+Bz = c
For simplicity, we examine problems where c = 0 and A
and B have a single non-zero value per row, as described
below. This can be thought of as consensus problems where
some cost information is private.
1) Problem Generation: Problems are generated ran-
domly as follows:
1) The size of the problem is determined by randomly
choosing the magnitudes m,n, p. The user defines
a maximum size maxdim and n and m are drawn
as integers on the uniform distribution [1,maxdim].
The number of consensus constraints p is then ran-
domly chosen by drawing an integer on the interval
[1,min(m,n)].
2) The problem will then be characterized by:
• Variables x ∈ Rn, z ∈ Rm,
• Cost terms P ∈ Rn×n, Q ∈ Rm×m, c ∈ Rn, d ∈
Rm,
• Constraint matrices A ∈ Rp×n, B ∈ Rp×m
3) Quadratic cost matrices P and Q are created by first
randomly composing LP ∈ Rn×n, LQ ∈ Rm×m with
entries drawn randomly from the uniform distribution
on [−S, S]. P and Q are then constructed to be
symmetric positive semi-definite by construction as
P = (LP )
TLP , Q = (LQ)
TLQ. To confirm that
these are positive semi-definite, the eigenvalues are
computed and checked to be greater than 0.
4) c and d are generated by randomly drawing values
from [−S2, S2], resulting in entries that are the same
magnitude as those in P and Q.
5) A is composed as A = [0 ∈ R(n−p)×(n−p), I ∈
Rp×p] and B is composed as B = [I ∈ Rp×p, 0 ∈
R(m−p)×(m−p)]
B. Solution Method
We consider the case where consensus is desired between
two actors who do not want to share information about their
cost information P, c and Q, d. In this scenario, ADMM is
a well-suited tool for achieving optimality without compro-
mising privacy.
For this problem, the ADMM algorithm can be stated as:
xk+1 = argminx x
TPx+ cTx+
ρ
2
||Ax+Bzk − c+ uk||22
zk+1 = argminz z
TQz + dT z +
ρ
2
||Bz +Axk+1 − c+ uk||22
uk+1 = uk +Axk+1 +Bxk+1 − c
The x-update and z-update steps constitute unconstrained
QPs, and can be solved analytically as described in the
Appendix. These analytic update steps were used to avoid
rounding issues resulting from using an iterative numeric
solver.
C. Attack Implementation
Attack was simulated by multiplying the optimal x-update
values by a vector with entries randomly selected from
+10%,−10%, i.e. a Bernoulli distribution, at each itera-
tion. It was found that choosing uniformly distributed zero-
centered noise was not sufficient to prevent convergence,
as small-magnitude noise entires allow the algorithm to
converge faster than the attacker is able to delay convergence.
A set of 10,000 QPs was simulated without attack, and
were found to converge in a median of 63 iterations, with
a mode of 16 iterations and a maximum value of 216
iterations. When simulated with the attack described above,
convergence was significantly hindered on the same QPs:
86% were not able to converge in 300 iterations, and 87%
do not converge in 500 iterations. The 14% of QPs which
converge in less than 300 iterations were found to behave
similarly to the unattacked QPs, likely due to a set of costs
which are strongly convergent even in the presence of attack.
The distribution of the iterations until convergence for both
the unattacked and attacked QPs is depicted in Figure 9.
D. Attack Detection Implementation
We implement the algorithm described above. As we
initially consider p ≤ 2, we need to complete at least 4
iterations in order to create two sets of difference equations.
To improve conditioning, for iteration i we consider the
difference equations with i and the reference point, and
compare with iteration 2 and iteration bi/2c. Using the
i, i−1, i−2 iterates was found to result in poor conditioning
and a very high (17%) false positive rate, though a slightly
lower false negative rate.
To ensure that we can solve for the values of the Hessian
entries, we check that the difference vectors are not collinear.
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Fig. 9: Convergence results for 10,000 QPs, simulated both
with and without noise-injection attack. Without attack, all
simulations converge in less than 300 iterations. Under
attack, 86% of problems do not converge in 500 iterations
(at which time calculation was stopped).
TABLE I: Results for a simulation of attack detection. 500
quadratic programs were generated without attack, and false
positives (upper right quadrant) were identified. An addi-
tional 500 quadratic programs were generated with simulated
attack, and false negatives measured.
(a) Results, total number of simulations
Attacked Unattacked
Attack Detected 479 0
No Attack Detected 21 500
Total 500 500
(b) Results, simulation error rate
Attacked Unattacked
Attack Detected 0.958 0
No Attack Detected 0.042 1.0
Total 1.0 1.0
E. Results
We show results for 1000 simulated problems, of which
500 were attacked and 500 were unattacked. The results are
presented as a confusion matrix in Table I, which shows both
accurate classifications and misclassifications. The number
of problems of each type is shown in Table I(a); the same
results are shown in proportional form in Table I(b).
We consider two types of errors: Type 1 (false positive,
upper right quadrant) errors, and Type 2 (false negative,
bottom leftquadrant ) errors. The experimental results were
compared when computing the local update with both nu-
meric solvers and with an analytic solution; both approaches
were found to give comparable results.
The choice of iterates used to compute the difference
equations was found to have a significant impact on the
results: as only n + 1 points are needed but k iterates are
available, there are k!(n+1)!(k−n−1)! possible choices for points
to use, assuming that the most recent point is chosen as a
base. A naive approach in which the n+1 most recent iterates
were used was found to result in poor numeric conditioning
and a large number of Type 1 errors; the results presented
here select the n + 1 iterates to be evenly spaced between
iterate 2 and iterate k.
VIII. LIMITATIONS
This algorithm has been tested with constrained and
unconstrained QPs of relatively small dimension, and in
development was also tested with linear programs. We have
not explored other problem types (e.g. second-order cone
programs, semi-definite programs) where the Hessian may
change over the iterates. We also have not expressly ad-
dressed the theoretical implications of using this on strongly-
convex problems (e.g. problems which can be bounded below
by a QP) compared with weakly-convex problems.
A. High-Dimensional Problems
We have previously assumed that n+1 iterates are needed
to assess the validity of the x-update step. Where n is
large, collecting sufficient iterates may be costly in time or
computation resources. Further, the problem may converge
before n+1 iterates are collected (Note, this is not a problem
if the goal is to prevent convergence-stopping attacks).
We consider two scenarios: one where the full set of x-
update variables are made public, and one where only the
variables associated with the linking constraint are made
public.
All x-variables are public: When all x-variables are made
public, the gradient is constructed as:
A ∈ Rp×n
xpub ∈ Rn
(zi − zi−1) ∈ Rm
(yi − ρB(zi − zi−1) ∈ Rp
−AT (yi − ρB(zi − zi−1)) ∈ Rn
The resulting gradient contains all x-dimensions, but will
be rank deficient, having span Rp and nullspace n − p. In
this case, each new point gives us n new dimensions, but we
also seek to determine the Hessian in n dimensions and n2
unknowns. We thus need to gather n+ 1 points.
Only linking dimensions are public: If only linking di-
mensions are public, the gradient is constructed as:
A ∈ Rp×p
xpub ∈ Rp
−AT (yi − ρB(zi − zi−1)) ∈ Rp
In this case, the gradient estimate fully spans the linking
dimensions, and each new point gives us p new equations.
We seek the Hessian in p dimensions and p2 unknowns, thus
needing to gather p+ 1 datapoints.
Either way, we only are able to assess nonconvexity in the
linking dimensions, and are unsure of activity in the other
dimensions.
IX. EXTENSIONS
A. Reducing Error Rates
As described above, the false positive and false negative
rates can be reduced by tuning the algorithm:
• Reducing False Positives: As previously described, false
positives result from poor numeric conditioning in
computing the Hessian from the system of difference
equations. Reducing these errors requires testing the
condition number of the system of equations, and poten-
tially also testing the condition number of the resulting
Hessian estimate. Neither topic has been explored here.
• Reducing False Negatives: False negatives occur when
the tested set of points do not indicate a non-convexity;
this is most likely to occur when the magnitude of
attack is small relative to the curvature of the x-update
function. Reducing this error rate requires testing a
variety of combinations of points in order to maximize
the likelihood of finding a point where magnitude of
the attack is large relative to the local curvature of the
function.
B. Improving Algorithmic Efficiency
We have not explored opportunities to improve the ef-
ficiency of the algorithm, but highlight three opportunities
here:
• Exploiting symmetry in Hessian: We have treated the
Hessian as having n2 unknowns, but as it is symmetric
there are actually only n(n + 1)/2 independent terms.
Exploiting this structure would mean that only d(n +
1)/2e+ 1 points are needed, but also requires pruning
the equation set to avoid over-determining the system
of equations.
• Exploiting problem-specific structure of Hessian:
For quadratic programs, the Hessian matrix is constant
throughout the problem, meaning that the difference
equations do not need to be constructed with respect
to a single point, but rather can be constructed using all
combinations of points. In this case, we need to only
use j iterates such that
(
j
2
)
> d(n+1)/2e+1, allowing
the algorithm to be started faster, and allowing for more
robust checking in the case of poor conditioning.
• Choosing point set: If the Hessian is computed multiple
times per iteration to reduce error rates as described
above, choosing the iterates wisely can improve numeric
conditioning and reduce the need for extra computa-
tions. This has not been explored.
X. EXTENSION: FULLY-DECENTRALIZED OPTIMIZATION
As the central information hub, the aggregator in a decen-
tralized optimization problem must be trusted to provide fair
updates to all the nodes. When the aggregator and the local
nodes have the same incentives – e.g., they are all computing
resources owned by the same entity – this is unlikely to
present a conflict of interests.
However, when the aggregator has different incentives
than the compute nodes, the local nodes may not trust
upstream
nodes
f(x), x ∈ X g(z), z ∈ Z downstream
nodes
...
xk
xk
zk
zk
. . .
Fig. 10: Fully-decentralized optimization problem structure,
highlighting two nodes and noting how this can be indef-
initely expanded with the addition of further upstream and
downstream nodes. Each node holds private information on
its own objective function, constraints, and dual variable (e.g.
ukx), and accepts updates from its immediate neighbors.
the central aggregator, e.g. if the aggregator can extract
additional profits by acting as a market maker. Further,
aggregator-based decentralized computation is subject to
several other weaknesses: it requires a high communication
overhead by coordinating message-passing between all nodes
(a significant hurdle for highly distributed systems like
energy devices), and introduces a central point of failure in
the case of communication/power outage or cyberattack.
To address these issues with aggregator-coordinated de-
centralized optimization, fully-decentralized algorithms have
been developed which take advantage of problem structure
to achieve consensus between nodes that directly share
constraints, rather than passing information from all nodes
to a centralized aggregator [36].
A. Fully-Decentralized ADMM
As an example, the ADMM algorithm from above can be
expressed in fully-decentralized form by introducing local
copies ux and uz of the penalty variables:
xk+1 := argminx∈X f(x) +
ρ
2
‖Ax+Bzk − c+ ukx‖22
(11)
zk+1 := argminz∈Z g(z) +
ρ
2
‖Axk+1 +Bz − c+ ukz‖22
(12)
uk+1x := u
k
x +Ax
k+1 +Bzk+1 − c (13)
uk+1z := u
k
z +Ax
k+1 +Bzk+1 − c (14)
Under restrictions described in [36], this can be shown
to have the same convergence and optimality guarantees as
conventional aggregator-based systems.
In systems where nodes are very sparsely connected,
this can produce a significant reduction in communication
overhead- e.g. in power systems we may seek an optimum
amongst millions of nodes, but each node is only connected
to its parent and one or two downstream nodes. Rather
than requiring that an aggregator handle millions of connec-
tions, nodes pass messages with their neighbors, ultimately
bringing the full system into optimum. For examples of this
approach applied to power systems, see e.g. [37], [38], [39].
XI. ATTACK VECTORS IN FULLY-DECENTRALIZED
OPTIMIZATION
As nodes in a fully-decentralized network are only con-
nected with their neighbors, they must assess whether up-
dates represent the true state of the network, or whether
wk = argminw[
Lρ(h(w), x
k, ukw)]
xk = argminx[
Lρ(f(x), w
k, zk, ukx)]
zk = argminz[
Lρ(g(z), x
?k, ukz)]
wk
xk
x?k
zk
(a)
wk = argminw[
Lρ(h(w), x˜
k, ukw)]
x˜k 6= argminx[
Lρ(f(x), w
k, zk, ukx)]
zk = argminz[
Lρ(g(z), x
?k, ukz)]
wk
x˜k
x?k
zk
(b)
w˜k 6= argminw[
Lρ(h(w), x
k, ukw)]
xk = argminx[
Lρ(f(x), w˜
k, zk, ukx)]
zk = argminz[
Lρ(g(z), x
?k, ukz)]
w˜k
xk
x?k
zk
(c)
Fig. 11: Potential attack scenarios in a fully-decentralized
optimization scenario, where the z-update node is attempting
to establish the veracity of a received update x?k. Without
knowing details of the private objective functions f(x), h(w)
and constraints x ∈ X , w ∈ W it is difficult to detect
and localize (or mitigate) an attack. The z-update node is
not generally able to determine the difference between the
unattacked scenario shown in (a), an attack by the immediate
upstream neighbor x˜k as in (b), and an attack by a node
further upstream such as w˜k as shown in (c).
the neighbor has been compromised and the update is spuri-
ous. The following sections highlight the unique challenges
of detecting, localizing, and mitigating attacks in a fully-
decentralized system, as shown graphically in Figure 11.
A. Attack Vector: Private Infeasibility Attack
In Section V, we highlighted how a malicious node may
distort its private constraints to shift the equilibrium out of
the operationally feasible region.
This attack is not identifiable in a fully-decentralized
system, as a node can not in general discern between the
update corrupted by its immediate neighbor
x?k
?
= argminx∈X˜Lρ(x, z
k−1, wk−1, uk−1x )
and a best response from a neighbor in reaction to a corrupted
signal from the upstream h(w) node:
x?k
?
= argminx∈XLρ(x, z
k−1, w˜k−1, uk−1x )
Alternately, on seeing x?k ∈ {Xpub|zk−1} it is necessary
to know wk in order to assess whether the problem is
truly feasible given the full state of the system, x?k
?∈
{X |wk−1, zk−1} (this can be extended to more complex sys-
tem architectures with more upstream/downstream nodes).
However, in a fully-decentralized system, w is not gener-
ally visible to x and so it is not possible for the z-update
node to assess whether x?k ∈ {Xpub|wk}.
This means that detection, localization, and mitigation
are all not possible in a conventional fully-decentralized
system, as a global information layer is needed to assess
the feasibility of the received updates, identify nodes which
may be causing infeasibility, and construct a best response.
B. Attack vector: Infeasible Linking Constraint
Similarly, on receiving an update x?k which would violate
the linking constraint {Ax?k +Bz = c|z ∈ Z} the z-update
node is not able to discern between an infeasible update
created by a neighboring node:
x?k
?
= x?k + εk
and an infeasible signal resulting from a malicious up-
stream/downstream node:
x?k
?
= argminx∈XLρ(x, z
k−1, w˜k−1, uk−1x )
= argminx∈XLρ(z
k−1, z, w?k−1 + ε, uk−1x )
However, if information on public constraints Zpub,Xpub
is knowable to all participants, these constraints can be
integrated into the local optimization problems as additional
(publicly known) constraints, converting the update step from
xk+1 = argminx∈XLρ(x, z
k, uk)
to
xk+1 = argminx∈X∩{Zpub|AT x+BT zk−c}Lρ(x, z
k, uk)
This would mean that any update which violates this con-
straint must be the result of a malicious node, and the
problem can be localized.
Attack Mitigation: If a feasible solution exists, it must
satisfy the constraints:
x? ∈ Z ⊂ Xpub
z? ∈ Z ⊂ Zpub
ATx? +BT z? = c
Therefore, at each step we can project any iterate onto the
feasible set described by the constraints above:
xˆk = argminz∈{Z|AT x+BT z=c}||x?k − z||22
In an unattacked case this projection simply accelerates
convergence of the standard ADMM algorithm.
In the case of attack, projection creates a xˆk ∈ {Z|ATx+
BT z = c} which is the best response to the attack x˜k. While
this best response will in general be suboptimal, it is feasible
and will let the primal residual r = Axk+Bzk−c converge
to zero even in the presence of attack.
C. Attack Vector: Zero-Mean Noise Injection
Because it is only dependent on local information (its
own history and updates received from the neighbors), each
node in a fully-decentralized network is able to carry out the
detection strategy outlined in Section VI for identifying the
presence of a noise-injection attack.
However, in a fully-decentralized network the node would
be challenged to identify whether the noise injection attack
originates from an immediate neighbor, or from an upstream
node.
Specifically, if h(w) represents the problem solved by
the upstream node, the z-update node cannot differentiate
between x?k ?= x?k + δ(k) and
x?k
?
= argminx∈XLρ(x, z
k−1, w˜k−1, uk−1)
= argminx∈XLρ(x, z
k−1, w?k−1 + δ(k − 1), uk−1)
Nevertheless, although the malicious node cannot be local-
ized, a zero-mean noise injection attack can be detected.
XII. SUMMARY OF SECURITY CHALLENGES
Table II(a) highlights the feasibility of achieving these
goals in conventional aggregator-coordinated optimization,
and Table II(b) shows the same capabilities in a fully-
decentralized system. We close by exploring approaches for
reaching these goals in a fully-decentralized environment.
TABLE II: Security issues in aggregator-coordinated and
fully-decentralized systems
(a) Detection Feasibility on Aggregator-Coordinated System
Detect Localize Mitigate
Private Infeasibility X X X
Linking Infeasibility X X
Noise Injection X X
(b) Detection Feasibility on Fully-Decentralized System
Detect Localize Mitigate
Private Infeasibility
Linking Infeasibility X X
Noise Injection X
A. Architectures for Security
Although aggregator-based systems present some security
and trust issues, the aggregator is able to take advantage
of global information to check the validity of each node’s
updates, enabling detection, localization, and mitigation
strategies, which are not available in the fully-decentralized
system.
However, if the fully-decentralized system is augmented
with a global information layer, the same security checks
become possible in a fully-decentralized environment. In this
section, we briefly discuss information architectures which
could allow a fully-decentralized system to take advantage
of the security benefits of an aggregator-coordinated system.
A number of different architectures might provide this
security:
0 1 2
3
0
1 2
3
0 1 2
3
0 1 2
3
(d)(c)
(a) (b)
Fig. 12: Potential architectures for allowing security checks
for fully-decentralized optimization algorithms.
1) A centralized database held by a trusted authority, with
security checks computed by each node
2) A fully-connected network with securely signed mes-
sages, in which each node maintains a database of
message history
3) A partially-connected network with bypass connections
to allow nodes to bypass suspect neighbors
4) A decentralized peer-to-peer database with message
histories, with security checks computed by each node
5) A blockchain used as a decentralized database to store
the message histories, with smart contracts used to
compute security checks in a decentralized manner.
Option 1 presents trust and monopoly distortion issues
described above, in addition to a high communication over-
head. Option 2 requires high computational overhead and
will fail if there are dropouts in communication with part
of the network; Option 3 has gained some attention as a
way to approach this while not requiring the same degree of
communication redundancy. The decentralized database in
Option 4 is appealing, but requires a method for reconciling
different versions of the database which might be proposed
by different neighbors. Further, both Option 1 and Option 4
do not guarantee that each node conducts the same security
checks.
By contrast, blockchains are decentralized databases which
rely on securely signed messages and a consensus mecha-
nism that simultaneously guarantees consistency across the
network and provides secure timestamping. Smart contracts
build on this architecture by guaranteeing the execution of
simple computational functions as part of the consensus
mechanism, thus guaranteeing consistent execution of secu-
rity checks.
Figure 13 conceptually shows how a blockchain-based sys-
tem enables the same type of security checks as are offered
by an aggregator system, by providing a cryptographically
secured global information layer with guaranteed execution
of the security checks outlined above.
Consequently, the features of cyberattack diagnostics al-
gorithms for aggregator-coordinator systems can be accom-
plished in a fully decentralized setting, if a shared and secure
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Fig. 13: Illustration of how a blockchain-based network
provides comparable security to an aggregator-coordinated
architecture
information layer is provided, such as blockchains.
XIII. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated the weaknesses of conventional
distributed and fully-decentralized architectures to a num-
ber of attack vectors, including distortion of the private
optimization problem, injection of noise, and distortion of
the linking constraints in fully-decentralized networks. As
optimization problems become distributed to consumer hard-
ware (e.g. smartphones, smartmeters, autonomous vehicles,
IoT devices), optimization algorithms becomes exposed to
these threats along an exponentially larger attack surface.
We examine methods for detecting and mitigating attacks. In
particular, we detail a detection algorithm for noise-injection
attacks for a set of stochastically generated ADMM prob-
lems. Discussions on limitation and extensions are provided,
along with perspectives on challenge and opportunities for
fully decentralized systems.
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APPENDIX
The x-update step is an unconstrained quadratic program,
and can be solved analytically. For clarity, we let γ = Bzk+
uk and proceed as:
xk+1 = argminx x
TPx+ cTx+
ρ
2
||Ax+ γ||22
xk+1 = argminx x
TPx+ cTx+
ρ
2
(Ax+ γ)T (Ax+ γ)
xk+1 = argminx x
TPx+ cTx+
ρ
2
(xTATAx+ 2γTAx+ γT γ)
0 =
∂
∂x
(
xTPx+ cTx+
ρ
2
(xTATAx+ 2γTAx+ γT γ)
)
0 = 2Px+ c+ ρATAx+ ργTA
0 = (2P + ρATA)x+ c+ ργTA
x = (2P + ρATA)−1(−c− ργTA)
Similarly, the z-update step can be solved analytically by
letting µ = Axk+1− c+ uk and following a similar process
to find:
zk+1 = (2Q+ ρBTB)−1(−d− ρµTB)
These analytic solutions are used in our implementation
to avoid inaccuracies induced from a numeric solution.
A. Comparison with Central Solution
Because the problem is an unconstrained QP and entries
with consensus between a subset of variables, a centralized
solution can be computed by composing the cost matrices
into a single quadratic problem which can be solved ana-
lytically. This is shown here for the case where c = 0 and
A and B are composed as described above, but also can be
computed for other A,B.
We break P and Q into sub-matrices dependent on the
number of consensus constraints p, where P11, Q00 ∈ Rp×p
and the other dimensions follow accordingly.
P =
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Similarly, the c and d vectors can be combined as
κ =
 c0c1 + d0
d1

The problem can then be expressed as an unconstrained
minimization problem:
minw wTΠw + κTw
which is solved by w∗ = − 12 (ΠT )−1κ
This central solution was used only for verification.
